thesabear
1382a63dae
Same treatment as the security batch - real tech names, 'why this vs the alternative' reasoning, heavy cross-linking, ranked/specific tradeoffs instead of generic hedges.
70 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
70 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
# 📈 Observability
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> [!NOTE]
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> Grafana Alloy runs natively on every fleet host, shipping logs to Loki and metrics to Prometheus via `remote_write` — pushed outward rather than scraped, a choice made specifically because of the firewall model in [`docs/firewall-and-network.md`](firewall-and-network.md), not despite it.
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| **Agent** | Grafana Alloy, native systemd service on every host, not Docker |
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| **Logs** | journald → Loki |
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| **Metrics** | Push-based `remote_write`, not pull-based scraping |
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| **Coverage** | All fleet hosts, confirmed live |
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## Why push instead of pull — the actual reasoning
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A pull-based model (Prometheus scraping every host directly) is the more common default, and it was rejected for a specific reason tied directly to [`docs/firewall-and-network.md`](firewall-and-network.md): scraping means the monitoring host needs inbound network access to every single host it monitors, which means punching a hole through the zero-blanket-allow firewall model for every host, every metrics port. A push model inverts that — only the monitoring host needs to accept inbound writes, and every other host only ever *initiates* outbound connections, which fits the existing "explicit outbound rule, default-deny inbound" posture instead of fighting it. The tradeoff is real: push-based metrics are slightly harder to reason about for ad-hoc debugging (no simple `curl` against a target to see what it'd report), but it was the right call given the network model already in place.
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## Pipeline
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```mermaid
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flowchart LR
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subgraph Sources["Per-host sources"]
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J["journald<br/>persistent, 14-day retention"]
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D["Docker container<br/>stdout/stderr"]
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N["node metrics<br/>CPU/mem/disk/net"]
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App["Native app metrics<br/>5 apps expose endpoints"]
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end
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Agent["Grafana Alloy<br/>native systemd service"]
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J --> Agent
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D -->|docker_hosts only| Agent
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N --> Agent
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App --> Agent
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Agent -->|logs| Loki["Loki"]
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Agent -->|remote_write, 30s| Prom["Prometheus"]
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```
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## Agent install: deliberate, not default
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> [!TIP]
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> The agent binary is downloaded directly from upstream releases and run under a hand-written systemd unit — not installed from a package repo or the vendor's own packaged service file. That's a real maintenance cost (manual version bumps instead of `apt upgrade` handling it), accepted because it keeps the exact version pinned and reproducible across the fleet through the same tag-driven Ansible model described in [`docs/iac-pipeline.md`](iac-pipeline.md), rather than whatever version a package repo happens to serve on a given day. Before install, a preflight check fails the run if the host doesn't run systemd, or if the root filesystem has too little free space for journald's own headroom, and configures/waits for time-sync confirmation (skipped on container-based hosts, where the clock can't be locally adjusted anyway).
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## Logs: journald only, no double-handling
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The system's built-in syslog daemon is explicitly disabled once journald takes over — avoids the same log stream getting handled twice, which would double both storage cost and noise in every downstream query. journald itself is switched from the default in-memory ring buffer to persistent on-disk storage, sized larger on the one host with much higher container-log volume than the rest of the fleet.
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```mermaid
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flowchart LR
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A["journald<br/>system logs"] --> L1["Loki<br/>job=system"]
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B["Docker API<br/>container logs<br/>survives recreation"] --> L2["Loki<br/>job=docker"]
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C["DNS query log<br/>daily rotation"] --> L3["Loki<br/>job=dns · real event time"]
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```
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Every host's logs land in the same Loki instance under its own host label, filterable in Grafana by host or job — the same "one source of truth, not N inconsistent ones" instinct behind the DNS model in [`docs/dns-naming.md`](dns-naming.md). Docker logs are scraped via the container runtime's own API (not by tailing log files on disk) specifically so log collection survives a container being recreated during the update flows in [`docs/registry-and-build.md`](registry-and-build.md) — tailing a file path would silently stop working the moment that container got rebuilt. The DNS query log pipeline (feeding into [`docs/dns-naming.md`](dns-naming.md)'s enforcement story) is kept deliberately separate from general system/container error tracking, with its timestamps extracted from the log line itself rather than ingestion time — the same UTC-vs-wall-clock discipline that matters when querying Wazuh's alert data in [`docs/security-monitoring.md`](security-monitoring.md).
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## Metrics: pushed, not pulled
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| App | What's exposed |
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| Vault | Dedicated read-only metrics token, separate from its normal agent token — see [`docs/secrets-and-pki.md`](secrets-and-pki.md) |
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| Kestra | Built-in metrics endpoint |
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| Gitea | Built-in metrics endpoint |
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| n8n | Built-in metrics endpoint |
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| Authentik | Built-in metrics endpoint, localhost-only |
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Five apps expose their own Prometheus-format metrics endpoints directly, scraped by that host's own Alloy instance and pushed through the same path as host-level metrics — no separate pipeline needed for app-level visibility, and no separate firewall exception needed either, since it rides the same outbound `remote_write` connection every host already has open.
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---
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Related: [`docs/firewall-and-network.md`](firewall-and-network.md), [`docs/dns-naming.md`](dns-naming.md), [`docs/security-monitoring.md`](security-monitoring.md), [`docs/dashy-soc-board.md`](dashy-soc-board.md) · Stacks: [`stacks/platform/grafana-stack/`](../stacks/platform/grafana-stack/)
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