Was reusing netbird-zero-trust-mesh-topology.svg (the doc's detailed
peer-topology diagram) in the README too - breaks this repo's own
established convention of the README getting its own dedicated asset
even when covering related material (see readme-trust-boundaries-
blast-radius.svg vs architecture-overview-trust-depth.svg). New diagram
is a simple perimeter-vs-zero-trust conceptual contrast, matching the
README section's generalized framing rather than NetBird's specific
implementation topology.
README: real dedicated 'Zero Trust, Actually Implemented' section (general
concept -> NetBird as the concrete implementation -> link out), host/doc
count bumped to 12/16, NetBird tool bullet.
netbird-zero-trust.md: dropped the LXC-provisioning tangent (not relevant
to a doc about NetBird itself), added self-hosted-vs-SaaS rationale, a
real Addressing table, and expanded split-DNS mechanism detail. Also
genericized personal-device specifics (device types/exact split of
access) that were too specific for the public repo.
New file covering NetBird - a self-hosted WireGuard mesh giving every
fleet host and personal device a stable overlay identity, with a
genuinely-implemented zero-trust policy layer (deny-by-default, groups,
scoped setup keys, peer approval, posture checks).
- Why a mesh over a classic VPN concentrator, illustrated with a real
topology diagram (control plane handles coordination only; actual
data flows peer-to-peer, bypassing it entirely - the literal
distinction from a concentrator, drawn not just asserted)
- Ties back to today's iac-pipeline.md update: this LXC is the first
host ever built through the new Terraform LXC-native path, start to
finish, no manual provisioning step
- Real bring-up incident: gRPC/h2c requirements broke through a naive
proxy chain, and a proxying CDN 403s the agent outright - both root
causes documented, not just the fixes
- Evidence: 3 real command blocks (docker ps, live Caddyfile splitter
config, netbird status --detail from an enrolled peer), 2 real
screenshots (dashboard Peers list, Access Control Policies - port
counts in the screenshot match the real policy detail in the text)
- Second diagram (edge routing chain) for the specific gRPC/h2c/path
split detail, kept separate from the topology diagram since they show
genuinely different shapes of information
- Honest, non-rounded-up rollout status table - several phases still
explicitly open
- Sanitize-checked: no internal IPs/domains/personal email
Also: fixes iac-pipeline.md's forward-reference to this doc to use the
repo's actual link convention ([docs/x.md](x.md)), not descriptive
prose link text.
Terraform gained a second provider (bpg/proxmox) alongside the existing
telmate/proxmox, via a new containers.tf / proxmox_virtual_environment_container
resource - real, live-verified against the actual repo files. Corrects
the doc's previous "Terraform only manages virtual machines... cannot
create or manage LXC containers" claim, which is no longer true.
- Terraform section: VM/LXC comparison table, real containers.tf
excerpt, explains why LXCs need an extra pct-exec bootstrap step
(stock template has no sshd, since it never went through Packer)
- WARNING section: new paragraph noting the LXC-provisioning gap is
closed for new hosts going forward (the three existing exceptions
stay as preserved history, not retroactively fixed) - forward-links
to docs/netbird-zero-trust.md (next commit)
- Fixed now-stale section heading ("one resource type" -> "two
resource types")
- Sanitize-checked: no internal IPs/domains
New export reflecting the user's latest diagram edit. Same white-line
strip as aae1ff2 applied fresh to this export (variant this time: flat
#1C1D1E plus inverted light-dark(#1C1D1E, #d3d4d5)) - verified 0 broken
patterns remain, valid XML, all 8 correct span backgrounds preserved.
Same fix as orchestration-flow-patterns.svg (8772564), applied after a
comprehensive re-check that found the bug wasn't limited to the 6 files
originally caught by a narrower pattern match - architecture-overview.svg
and firewall-and-network-docker-bypass.svg were also affected.
Confirmed via a control test on orchestration-flow-patterns.svg that the
.drawio source's labelBackgroundColor property was never the actual
cause (reverted it, re-exported, still broken, still fixed cleanly by
the same strip) - this is a draw.io export-time quirk, not a content or
convention problem, so no CLAUDE.md changes needed.
Each file: stripped the same broken wrapper-div background-color
declarations (flat #1C1D1E / #ffffff, or the equivalent light-dark()/
var(--ge-adaptive-bg) variants - not consistent across exports of the
same file), verified 0 remain, valid XML, and the correct adaptive span
background count unchanged before/after in every file.
Files: architecture-overview.svg, firewall-and-network-docker-bypass.svg,
iac-pipeline-tools-flow.svg, observability-pipeline.svg,
readme-trust-boundaries-blast-radius.svg, secret-distribution-flows.svg,
secrets-and-pki-lifecycle.svg
The exported SVG's 4 edge labels (no/yes/approve/decline) had two extra,
non-adaptive background-color declarations stamped onto their wrapper
divs by the draw.io exporter (flat #ffffff, and an undefined
var(--ge-adaptive-bg) CSS variable that falls back to #ffffff) -
independent of both the .drawio source content and the export dialog's
Appearance setting (tested Automatic and Light, both showed it).
Surgically stripped just those two declarations from the exported SVG,
verified count (4+4 removed, 0 remaining), confirmed the correct
adaptive span background (light-dark(white, #1C1D1E)) and every other
color in the diagram were untouched, confirmed still valid XML.
- Replaced both mermaid diagrams with real Nextcloud diagrams; the
Ansible-stages rebuild caught a real omission - the old diagram showed
only 2 stages (init/compliance) when there are genuinely 3
(provisioning.yml exists too, currently just clamav/rocky-docker)
- Live-verified against the real iac repo: roles_metadata.yml (9
cis_hardening + 6 other compliance roles, 1 provisioning role),
kickstart partitioning/packages/SSH config, both Packer bootstrap
scripts, terraform.tfvars, pct list on both hypervisors, a real
rendered host_tags.yml
- KB fix: LXC Strategy note's PBS row was wrong, not just stale - PBS
genuinely has a populated vm_tags list and live compliance roles
(confirmed via real artifacts on the host itself), not 'never
Ansible-managed' as it said; corrected and re-verified via re-fetch
- Added real content not previously in the doc: the deliberately
permissive build-time SSH window closed by ssh_hardening, the
admin/ansible identity split baked into the image at build time, and a
third pipeline exception (PBS) that's genuinely different in kind from
the other two, including a real Rocky-vs-Debian PAM ordering bug found
onboarding it
- Considered two screenshot candidates (Proxmox template list, VM/LXC
mix) - declined as low-value; command evidence covers this
source-driven topic well on its own
- Sanitize-checked: no internal IPs/MACs/domains/personal info/forbidden
app names
- Replaced mermaid diagram with real Nextcloud diagram; rebuild caught a
real bug in the old one (showed Kopia/Bazarr flowing through the App
Router, which flows.json disproves - they bypass it entirely)
- Live-verified Mosquitto broker config/ACL, Node-RED flow routing (16
switch rules = 15 apps + unknown fallback, 2 dedicated endpoints),
mqtt-monitor.sh check count against the real script
- Named NetBox and Kestra directly (previously generic) after the real
Node-RED screenshot made them visible anyway; Postiz/nocodb-content
stay generic per standing instruction
- Added real evidence: routing-table command output, the real
topic-agnostic Inventory Parse function source, real Mosquitto
ACL/config, real check-count grep, a real Node-RED flow canvas
screenshot, and a real Mosquitto connection log screenshot (the
kestra-notify client is live proof of the MQTT-not-HTTP claim)
- KB fix: Ansible mqtt_client Role note was missing a 23rd real check
(crash-looping systemd units, distinct from the failed-units check,
added to the script after a real vault-agent crash-loop incident)
- Sanitize-checked: no internal IPs/domains/personal info/forbidden app
names
1. Live-verify: journald persistent-storage config confirmed on two
hosts (1G vs 500M cap, matches the doc's claim exactly), Alloy
active confirmed across all 11 fleet hosts.
2. Fix KB: Alloy Agent Model was stale - version had moved from
v1.18.0 to v1.18.1 on all 8 'newer' hosts since last checked,
role's own default still unreconciled at 1.17.1. Fixed and
confirmed via re-fetch.
3. Pulled the full Observability Pipeline tree: Alloy Agent Model,
Log Flow, Metrics Flow.
4. Replaced both mermaid diagrams (broke this repo's Nextcloud-SVG
convention) with real diagrams built through the proper round-trip.
5. Evidence: real journald config dumps, plus 3 real Grafana
screenshots (host metrics dashboard, detailed Loki log stream
showing job=technitium-dns/docker/system, and the fleet-wide log
volume dashboard) - one screenshot round caught and fixed an
unredacted internal IP before being used.
6/7. Compelling-proof test passes; sanitize-check clean.
Step 5 re-audit, completing the checklist gap that started this whole
detour. Added: the real hyper2 host_vars comment (matches the WARNING
callout's reasoning almost word for word), the real automation-self-
update.timer schedule, the real Kestra flow list (visually confirms
13 total flows), and app-update's real execution topology (visually
confirms wait_for_approval as an actual node, not just a diagram
concept).
Step 5 re-audit. The table itself (the file's central correction from
earlier this session) had no embedded evidence - only the corrected
count was asserted. Added the real, freshly-repulled provider list
confirming all 10 by actual model type, not just name.
Step 5 re-audit. The wazuh_agent_tuning root-cause comment adds a
specific fact not previously in the doc (9 of the fleet's agents
affected). The SCA dashboard screenshot is the doc's first visual
evidence - everything else was CLI/text - and shows a real 87% score,
directly proving the 'below 100% is an accepted tradeoff' claim with
an actual number instead of just asserting the policy.
Step 5 re-audit. Caddyfile contrast (skip-verify default vs Vault's
real cert verification block) shown as text, IP/domain genericized.
The cert-rebuild hook script's real 19-day-expiry story is shown as a
screenshot instead of a text excerpt - the script has a hardcoded P12
password in its body, so a screenshot with that one line blurred shows
the actual guard logic in full without a text-copy risk of the
password ever landing in a file.
Step 5 re-audit. Both verified live earlier this session but never
shown: the registry-token shared template entry (proves the shared-
path mechanism), and the technitium_api_token lookup (proves the
flagged admin/runtime-split exception with the actual Jinja syntax).
Step 5 re-audit. Both were verified live earlier this session but
never shown - the strategy breakdown backs the doc's own headline
stat directly, and the mariadb-latest entry proves the specific
shared-mirror mechanism rather than just describing it.
Two fixes from the step 5 re-audit:
1. The joplin/public-tool evidence blocks showed bracketed placeholders
inside function arguments ('joplin.[app-to-app zone]') - not valid
syntax, wouldn't produce the shown NXDOMAIN for the claimed reason.
Replaced with result tables showing the same real data honestly.
2. Added the real Technitium screenshot of the cleaned-up reverse zone.
Getting this screenshot caught a real methodology error: an earlier
claim of '2 real PTR records (automation, caddy)' was wrong - the
automation entry only resolved because I tested it by SSHing into
automation itself, which satisfied the lookup via its own local
/etc/hosts, never actually querying Technitium. Querying from a
different host returns NXDOMAIN, matching the screenshot's real
3-record zone (NS, SOA, one PTR) exactly. Only 1 real PTR record
exists. Same error existed in the KB, fixed there too.
Step 5 re-audit - real screenshot of the Vault tile's expanded detail
panel (UNSEALED, real lease/token/KV/secret-engine counts, TTL
distribution, CA cert expiry), showing the specialty-widget behavior
the Layout section describes but the existing screenshot doesn't show.
Captured after fixing the metrics-reader token issue found while
requesting this screenshot - first attempt genuinely showed a false
SEALED state, now shows the real healthy panel.
The block added earlier this pass showed a grep pattern with a
bracketed placeholder embedded inside the regex itself
('\.[service-to-service zone]') - not valid regex syntax, would never
produce the shown output if actually run. Replaced with the real
command (matching the _URL constant-naming pattern, which doesn't
need the domain at all) and its real output, domain suffix genericized
in output only. Separated the Authentik/Slack/fleetAudit/pfSense
reasoning into prose, not disguised as more grep output.
Step 5 re-audit - real screenshot showing the underlying table data
(50 records, all columns) that the Dashy heatmap is rendered from,
distinct from the two existing rendered-widget screenshots.
The two blocks added earlier this pass showed 'curl | jq' syntax that
was never actually run - the real command was 'curl | python3 -c'
via SSH. The output text was genuinely real either way, but the
command shown wasn't what produced it. Replaced with the literal
command actually executed, re-run fresh to confirm the output still
matches.
Step 5 re-pass under the strengthened evidence gate. The 14-source
count was the doc's own opening framing claim but had no evidence
attached - I'd verified it live earlier this session (grepping the
real function for every upstream host it calls) but never actually
showed the work. Added it.
Step 5 re-pass under the strengthened evidence gate. Both the
app-update duration correction and the Authentik 404 finding were
narrative-only, backed by data I'd already verified live but never
actually shown. Added the real NocoDB row notes as evidence blocks.
Left the other three bullets as-is - the file already has 2 real
screenshots plus these 2 data blocks, judged sufficient rather than
padding every bullet for its own sake.
Live-checked every flow's actual Kestra definition for a Pause task.
Only app-update has one; the other 6 main flows (os-update-vms,
container-update, disk-cleanup, os-update-pbs, os-update-pve,
os-update-pve-verify) run fully automatically with no human checkpoint
at all - their safety net is the automated health-check/rollback path,
not human approval. The doc previously presented check->pause->approve
as the universal pattern for all 13 flows and stated outright that
'nothing gets changed on the fleet without a human explicitly resuming
a paused flow', which was false for the flows that actually change
the fleet. The KB was already correct on this point.
Also replaced the mermaid diagram (broke this repo's established
Nextcloud-SVG convention) with a real diagram showing both patterns,
plus live evidence of the Pause-task check itself.
Live-queried Authentik's API directly: firefly (and emby, not in this
doc's table anyway) are both Proxy Provider only, no native OIDC/OAuth2
provider exists for either. Real count is 10 apps with native OIDC,
not the 11/12 both this doc and the KB previously implied. Same gap
existed in the Authentik/SSO Integration KB note, fixed there too.
Live-checked docker_stacks.yml directly. Total/dockerfile-strategy
counts (41/36) and the pinned_manual holdouts were already accurate.
But docker-socket-proxy and kodi's mariadb service were wrongly listed
as still hitting Docker Hub directly - both actually float a :latest
pull against a dedicated in-fleet mirror stack (docker-socket-proxy-
mirror, mariadb-latest) built via the normal dockerfile pattern. Fixed
the table and documented the real mechanism. Same gap existed in the
KB note, fixed there too.
The rest of the doc consistently says 'browser-facing zone'/'app-to-app
zone' and never states the literal domain suffixes. One evidence code
block leaked both real domains as part of the FQDNs being resolved -
fixed to match the doc's own established pattern. Caught because I'd
only sanitize-checked my own diff, not the whole file - full-file grep
for thesabear.net now confirms zero literal domain mentions.
Live audit found 4 records in the reverse zone, all wrong: 2 malformed
PTR entries (name/value swapped, never actually resolved), 1 orphaned
record from a decommissioned host, 1 correct-looking but misleading
record (proxy host's PTR pointing at one proxied app's name instead of
its own identity). All fixed live on Technitium today, not just
documented. Doc updated to describe the real defect and the fix.
The 6-tier dependency ladder doesn't mirror that doc's trust-boundary
structure (4 boundaries, 3 routing authorities - a different taxonomy).
The 6-tier list only exists in the live code; no public doc documents
it, so the doc now describes it standalone instead of pointing at a
file that doesn't actually contain it.
Same status the disaster-recovery.md conversation already ruled out of
the public repo - operationally true, not employer-facing. KB and
NocoDB job notes keep the real detail; only the public prose changes.
Live-verified against real infrastructure: Kopia's real repo/disk,
PBS's real datastore path, os_update role's real batch/abort behavior
against the actual Ansible code, and the real tag-driven
roles_metadata.yml mechanism behind Layer 1's rebuild claim. Caught a
real KB staleness in the process (PBS datastore usage, 3 weeks stale)
and fixed it properly - removed the point-in-time number entirely
rather than refreshing it, since a data-snapshot doesn't belong in
Trilium at all per the existing content-philosophy rule. Replaced
both mermaid diagrams with real branch/decoupling-shaped Nextcloud
diagrams. All 3 source KB notes stamped.
Found by actually re-checking the running function instead of stopping
at what was already written: each finding has a "Copy Debug Prompt"
button generating a ready-to-paste AI-triage prompt, with a built-in
"don't act without approval" instruction baked into the template
itself. Embedded the real board screenshot (redacted) - dependency
ladder, Wazuh KPIs, Active Issues strip, per-host tile grid - since a
doc about a visual dashboard needs to actually show it, not just
describe it in command output.
Live-verified every specific claim directly against the real Node-RED
function source (not just trusted from the KB): the 104,443-char
function size, all 5 Wazuh finding categories, Vault's live PKI cert
endpoints, the real DNS Security Signals implementation, the
fleetAudit global pattern, the 12-app Slack channel map, the
acknowledge key format and localStorage key name, and the Mustache
triple-brace URL gotcha. Replaced both mermaid diagrams: the flat
data-sources fan-in became a real specifics table (redundant diagram
cut per the diagramming standing process), and the acknowledge-flow
diagram was rebuilt as a real Nextcloud diagram. Stamped both source
KB notes.
Live-verified against the real Technitium server: spot-checked
caddy-only/local-only hosts and Postiz's zero-presence claim via
direct DNS resolution, confirmed the forwarder list directly from the
real dns.config (pfSense + Quad9 only, no Cloudflare), and confirmed
the reverse zone's real /24 scope plus its sparse PTR content via
live reverse lookups - fixed the KB stamp accordingly after an
earlier version of it claimed these weren't re-checked. Replaced the
mermaid zone-routing diagram with a real branch-shaped Nextcloud
diagram. Real command output embedded throughout instead of
paraphrased claims.
Live-verified the container_update role's strategy_dockerfile.yml
task file exists at the exact path the KB names, stamped the source
note. Replaced the mermaid cheap-check flowchart with a real
branch-shaped Nextcloud diagram. Added: the real Vault-backed push
auth mechanism (Gitea PAT -> Vault Agent -> docker login
--password-stdin, same pattern as everywhere else in the fleet), the
real docker manifest inspect command instead of a vague "digest
check", real app names in the holdouts table instead of generic
descriptions (matching how the rest of this repo already names real
apps), the anonymous-volume-pruning detail, and a real (redacted)
screenshot of the actual Gitea package registry showing genuine
self-built container images.
Live-verified against the real Wazuh manager (agent_control -l: 11
active agents matching exactly; docker ps: real manager container
name) and stamped both source KB notes. Replaced both mermaid
flowcharts with real branch-shaped Nextcloud diagrams (alert-handling
gate, compliance-hardening gate). Added real evidence throughout: the
live agent roster, a real synthetic SSH-failure line piped through
wazuh-logtest showing actual decoding/rule-match output (MITRE ATT&CK
+ compliance tags included), and real rule IDs in the runbook table
instead of vague categories. New content: the fleet-wide agent
log-queue-overflow bug found and fixed via a dedicated tuning role,
and the compose-stack-vs-rules version-control split.
Swapped the curl/jq text block for what the doc actually needed:
real screenshots of the live Dashy Fleet Schedule Heatmap widget -
one showing a populated cell clicked open (proving the TIP's
click-to-expand claim is real, not just described), one showing the
"no fixed time" section for the 15 jobs excluded from the grid.
Live-pulled the actual 50-row NocoDB inventory (also caught and fixed
a stale KB fact along the way - the note pointed at the wrong NocoDB
deployment entirely, nocodb-content/automation instead of the real
nocodb/rocky-docker instance). Replaced the vague weight-formula prose
with the real numbers, cut the mermaid diagram that only restated the
prose above it, and added five real stories mined from populating the
table by hand: a three-way monthly collision fix, a cascading
Kopia->ClamAV reschedule, a duration figure corrected 8x after
checking real completed-run data, the heaviest job in the whole fleet
(not a backup), and a 404 that looked like an auth problem and
wasn't. Enriched the pending PBS datastore bug with its real
resolution options and added a second real gap: Technitium's
blocklist auto-update is configured but silently a no-op.
The zone-band labels spelled out *.local.thesabear.net and
*.caddy.thesabear.net literally - the same internal zone naming
pattern already sanitized out of this doc's prose, missed on the
diagram itself. Replaced with generic zone names, no domain.
Sequence diagram showing the browser carries every hop itself -
Authentik and the app never talk directly - with only the OAuth
authorize/token exchange crossing from the browser-facing zone into
the service-to-service zone. Built to the public-repo diagram
conventions in CLAUDE.md (labelBackgroundColor + matching rich-text
span, off-line label positioning, line-color-matched labels, legend
instead of a color-explaining caption).
Asset renames (matching the new Nextcloud source naming convention —
doc name first, then description):
- architecture-trust-depth.svg -> architecture-overview-trust-depth.svg
- firewall-docker-bypass.svg -> firewall-and-network-docker-bypass.svg
- secrets-lifecycle.svg -> secrets-and-pki-lifecycle.svg
- trust-boundaries-blast-radius.svg -> readme-trust-boundaries-blast-radius.svg
Updated all 4 markdown references accordingly.
Also refreshed diagram exports (secret-distribution-flows.svg, and the
4 renamed ones) with today's fixes, and folded in the earlier pending
sso-and-identity.md work: precise live-verified native-OIDC app list
(12 apps, not ~9), the Proxmox no-Proxy-Provider exception, real API
evidence for it, and the automation-bot migration story.
Root cause was the edge's own labelBackgroundColor style property,
left enabled with no explicit value in the app, distinct from the
label's HTML text styling entirely. Set it explicitly to #1C1D1E,
then stripped a competing plain-white background layer draw.io's
export was still injecting on top of it.
draw.io's export was auto-injecting its own adaptive-background CSS
onto edge labels regardless of source content, with a fallback that
didn't match the page. Stripped background-color entirely so labels
sit directly on the page background with nothing to mismatch.
Nextcloud's draw.io export was inconsistently applying its own
page-level adaptive-background variable to some edge labels instead
of the authored value, making them render darker than the rest.
Post-processed the exported SVG to normalize every label to the same
background value.
Add the Suricata dual-layer detail (DNS lockdown, Vault protection
each enforced independently at two layers) and honest live-backend
churn instead of a flat inventory list. Drop the disabled-LAN-frontend
TIP entirely — not worth keeping in the public doc.
Pulled every pfSense child note (Default Policy, Proxmox Firewall Usage,
VM-Level Firewalld Strategy, WAN Rules, Security Tooling, Failure Impact,
HAProxy, Aliases, DNS & Resolver Config, LAN Rules, NAT, VPN), not just
the originally-scoped subset. Live-verified firewalld defaults, SSH
rich-rule restrictions, and Vault's per-client rules directly against
the running hosts - all matched exactly.
Caught and fixed a real staleness bug in the KB itself: WAN Rules and
Security Tooling (both dated a week old) still described CrowdSec as
active, but the more recent Aliases note (updated yesterday, checked
against pfSense's actual config.xml) confirmed the package has been
fully purged. Fixed both stale notes and the public doc, which had
already inherited the wrong claim.
Folded in the staged PAM defense-in-depth note properly - found the
fuller, better story directly in the Ansible role's source comments
(the bug hit twice, on two different hosts, before the permanent fix).
Added the LAN lockdown narrative this doc was missing, the DNS
bypass-block defense-in-depth story, and the this-week port-alias
conversion. Cut two redundant Mermaid diagrams. Added real evidence:
four pfSense screenshots already validated for architecture-overview.md
reused here since they directly prove this doc's own claims, plus two
real firewall-cmd command outputs from live verification this session.
Source Trilium notes (Authentik/SSO Integration, Gitea Access Model)
live-verified and stamped this session - authentik_api_token confirmed
in vault.yml, automation-bot confirmed as a real non-admin Gitea account
via the API.
Cut the redundant Mermaid diagram (prose right below it said the same
thing). Restored the LDAP/superuser-outpost exception from the source
note as a compact callout rather than a full section, proportionate to
its actual weight. Added the real reasoning for centralizing auth and
the proxy-layer defense-in-depth argument, a table of the ~9 apps
running real native OIDC/SAML on top of the universal Proxy Provider
baseline (corrected after initially misstating it as either/or), the
provider-removal discipline, and two screenshots proving the Write/
Read-only access split instead of just asserting it.
Edge-label captions were using an ambient light-dark() background that
didn't match Gitea's actual dark theme. Fixed to a plain rgb(13,17,23),
matching the corrected CLAUDE.md diagram convention.
Source Trilium note (Secret Distribution Model) was live-verified and
stamped this session - Certificate Flow, App Secret Flow, Configuration
Distribution Flow, and the technitium_api_token Vault-KV exception all
confirmed against the real hosts, not just trusted from the KB.
Replaced the Mermaid diagram, which incorrectly showed the Configuration
Distribution Flow feeding into Vault directly, with a corrected version:
that flow is a control-plane gate on what Vault Agent renders, not a
peer data flow. Added a real Vault Agent log excerpt proving the full
redeploy chain (restart -> render -> reload_command -> container
recreated) actually happens, and restored the technitium_api_token
exception that was in the source note but missing from this doc.
Publishing a ranked list of a live system's own weak points - including
explicitly naming the "single highest-value target" - is a real security
problem for a public repo, not a portfolio concern. Removed the section
and the matching stat-table row. Left the fixed cert-renewal incident in
place since there's nothing exploitable in a resolved issue.
Access model now covers the narrowly-scoped read-only utility policies
(ansible sync roles, metrics-reader, pki-reader) alongside the
host-scoped svc-* pattern - the fuller picture confirmed live against
Vault's actual ACL policy list, not just the original narrower claim.
Added two real screenshots: the live policy list, and an actual audit
log entry showing a KV read with every secret value as hmac-sha256:...
instead of plaintext - proof for the audit-trail claim instead of just
an assertion of it.
Removed the before/after plaintext-secrets Mermaid diagram (the bullets
right below it already said the same thing more clearly) and the
Architecture flowchart (its per-host labels were silently missing
registry-token and Hawser-secret details that didn't fit in the boxes).
Replaced the flowchart with an accurate, complete "who gets what" table
sourced directly from Trilium, one sentence for the proxy-routing fact
it was trying to show, and a new sequence diagram for the actual secret
lifecycle (auth -> render -> read -> async rotation) - a genuinely
different kind of diagram since that's process/time-ordered information
a table can't represent well.
Also restored real specificity Trilium had that the doc had flattened
into vague language: the cert-renewal row now names Technitium
specifically and states the actual incident (an expired cert silently
served for 19 days before the auto-rebuild hook existed), and the audit
trail row now states the real rotation policy (weekly, 8 generations).
Removed the dependency-graph Mermaid diagram (had backwards Vault
dependency arrows, contradicted the documented ingress model) and the
four-boundary Mermaid diagram (fully redundant with the table below it).
Verified every remaining claim against Trilium's Traffic Flow Model and
fixed two that didn't hold up: the DNS-bypass failure behavior overstated
an unconditional SSO bypass, and the notifications failure behavior had
an unsourced claim about backlog retry.
Added the real story behind the trust-boundary hardening (three stages
of the same "trusted by default" flaw getting found and closed, not a
changelog of dated facts), a new trust-depth diagram showing that being
"inside the network" still enforces its own internal boundaries, and
real pfSense screenshots proving the LAN lockdown rules actually exist
in production, not just in the doc.
Two real, working scripts: an Ansible playbook run-menu (the same
pattern used identically across both the fleet-config and infra-
provisioning repos), and cuesplit, a frame-accurate FLAC/.cue
splitting utility. Sanitized paths only, logic untouched.
README gets a new "Scripts & Tooling" section pointing at it, placed
right after "What's Running" alongside the other repo-structure
pointer.
Adds the two Dockerfiles nextcloud's compose build: contexts were
already referencing but never had (custom smbclient support for the
main container, a documentserver base for euro-office) - both had
their real internal-CA-trust mechanism replaced with a comment
explaining what's there and why, per the standing rule against
publishing that detail.
Also fixes a compose bug: kodi-ma-bridge's `environment:` key had
been dropped, leaving KEY=value pairs nested under `env_file:` (which
expects file paths, not inline vars) - would have made docker-compose
try to open a file literally named `TZ=${TZ}`.
Rest of this commit is manual cleanup (comment tidying, dropped
personal media-library volume mounts, a couple of .env comment
trims).
Replaced 29 host-port values across 27 stacks with the app's own
well-known default (read directly from each compose file's own
container-side port mapping) instead of the arbitrary port numbers
this fleet actually assigns to avoid collisions across ~44 services
on one host. More recognizable to a reader, and removes the last
fleet-specific detail these files carried.
Also removes a stale adminer service from n8n's stack entirely
(compose service + .env var) - it's no longer actually deployed.
Adds cloudcommander and it-tools .env files. it-tools' private .env
had two real domains (it-tools.local.thesabear.net,
it-tools.thesabear.net) that the public compose file doesn't
reference at all, so dropped along with the unused DOCKER var.
This completes .env/.env.secrets.ctmpl coverage across every
category in stacks/ (identity-and-security, platform, media,
productivity, dev-tools) - every var cross-checked against its
actual public compose file throughout.
Adds real Vault Agent secret templates and non-secret env vars for
all 9 productivity stacks. Sanitized several real leaks: a real
residential public IP (ghost's UMAMI_IGNORE_IP), real personal
domains/email used across joplin/n8n/ghost/paperless-ngx, and a
real embedded OAuth client ID in paperless-ngx's private OIDC config
(dropped entirely - the public compose file doesn't wire up OIDC at
all, so none of that config was needed).
Also dropped n8n secrets referencing the out-of-scope Content
Pipeline system (nocodb-content, Postiz), and did not carry over a
real Redis password found sitting in plaintext in nextcloud's
private .env (unused by the public compose anyway).
Every var cross-checked against what its actual public compose file
references before writing.
Adds real Vault Agent secret templates and non-secret env vars for
all 15 media stacks. Sanitized real leaks found in the source data:
kodi's real username and real hostnames+IPs in KODI_INSTANCES,
tdarr's real IP and hostname reference, immich's real username -
replaced with generic values (IPs use the RFC 5737 documentation
range, 192.0.2.0/24, rather than another real-looking address).
Every var cross-checked against what its actual public compose file
references before writing, learned from the platform batch.
Adds real Vault Agent secret templates and non-secret env vars for
14 platform stacks (caddy, caddy-internal, dashy, docker-socket-
proxy, dockhand, gitea, grafana-stack, hawser, kestra, kopia,
mosquitto, nocodb, node-red, speedtest-tracker), sanitized per the
kv/host/... convention established for identity-and-security.
Also fixes 6 variable-name mismatches discovered while cross-checking
every new .env/.ctmpl against what its actual public compose file
references (the public compose files were already adapted from the
private originals during an earlier reorg pass, so names don't always
match 1:1): authentik (PG_USER/PG_DB/PG_PASS), gitea (added
GITEA_DOMAIN/GITEA_ROOT_URL, dropped an unused duplicate-instance pair
of vars), grafana-stack (GRAFANA_ADMIN_PASSWORD), kestra (added
USERNAME/PASSWORD), kopia (SECRET_PASSWORD), nocodb (JWT_SECRET).
Also dropped an unused DOCKER var across most stacks where the
compose file hardcodes its path instead of referencing it.
Adds the real Vault Agent secret-rendering templates and non-secret
env vars for authentik, vaultwarden, and wazuh - sanitized (real
domain/email/SMTP provider genericized, kv/<host>/... paths use a
generic 'host' placeholder instead of the real hostname). This is
the standing pattern for the rest of stacks/ going forward.
Removed: ollama (AI-related concerns), emby/qbittorrent/prowlarr
(media-download concerns), bookstack (being deprecated in the
homelab), and mariadb-latest/mysql-8/postgres-18-alpine/valkey-9.0-
alpine (build-only base-image factories - nothing connects to them,
they add no portfolio value on their own; real per-app DB usage,
e.g. Kodi's own mariadb service, already lives in that app's stack
folder and is unaffected).
Stack count updated 53 -> 44 in both README references.
- Heading capitalization consistent Title Case throughout
- Moved the three personal sections (What I Have Explored, What I'm
Focused On, Fun Fact) from between the two strongest technical
sections to after Systems/What's Running, as a closing note -
keeps momentum through the trust-boundary story into the diagram
and full Systems breakdown, and gives the page a real closing beat
instead of ending on a bare stack-count line
- Split the dense opening bio paragraph into two at its natural seam
Adds a real drawio-exported diagram to "Why Four Trust Boundaries,
Not One" showing the physical blast-radius split behind the routing-
authority claim in the text (previously prose-only). Sanitized -
verified no real hostnames/IPs made it into the export.
Also reorders all 14 Systems bullets alphabetically for easier
scanning.
Fixed one real inaccuracy (Gitea registry scope, Secret Distribution
path count) and replaced generic descriptions with true, specific
detail across all 14 Systems bullets - real incidents, real design
decisions, concrete numbers - each checked against Trilium and, where
relevant, the live Ansible roles rather than trusted at face value.
Also stages a verified-but-unintegrated PAM hardening finding in
docs/firewall-and-network.md for that file's own upcoming audit pass.
1.15em rendered fine (sanitizer allow-list is working, confirmed by
the stat-table numbers) but was too subtle a jump to actually look
bigger next to body text. 1.4em matches the visual weight of the
stat-strip numbers.
Gitea's default sanitizer strips style="" from every element; added a
markup.sanitizer allowlist for style on common tags (app.ini, this
Gitea instance) and restarted the service. Now that it's actually
respected: table centered via style="margin:0 auto" (the deprecated
align attribute never reliably did this), and the app-name font-size
bump from the last commit should finally show up too.
Plain markdown bold has no size control. Switched each app name to
<strong style="font-size:1.15em;"> so it stands out from the
description text instead of just being the same size in bold.
align="center" and a div wrapper both failed to actually center the
table under Gitea's markdown CSS. Rather than keep guessing, dropped
the centering attempt - table stays left-aligned with its per-cell
alignment intact.
align="center" on <table> itself gets ignored - Gitea's markdown CSS
forces tables to display:block for horizontal scroll, which breaks
that attribute. Wrapping in <div align="center"> actually centers it.
Table wasn't centered on the page (only text inside cells was) - added
align=\"center\" to the table itself. Icons were arbitrary; replaced
with ones that actually trace back to the related system's own icon
elsewhere in this doc (Docker whale for compose stacks, the brick wall
from Firewall & Network Segmentation for trust boundaries, the same
cycle icon Orchestration uses for automated maintenance flows).
thesabear