Found by actually re-checking the running function instead of stopping
at what was already written: each finding has a "Copy Debug Prompt"
button generating a ready-to-paste AI-triage prompt, with a built-in
"don't act without approval" instruction baked into the template
itself. Embedded the real board screenshot (redacted) - dependency
ladder, Wazuh KPIs, Active Issues strip, per-host tile grid - since a
doc about a visual dashboard needs to actually show it, not just
describe it in command output.
Live-verified every specific claim directly against the real Node-RED
function source (not just trusted from the KB): the 104,443-char
function size, all 5 Wazuh finding categories, Vault's live PKI cert
endpoints, the real DNS Security Signals implementation, the
fleetAudit global pattern, the 12-app Slack channel map, the
acknowledge key format and localStorage key name, and the Mustache
triple-brace URL gotcha. Replaced both mermaid diagrams: the flat
data-sources fan-in became a real specifics table (redundant diagram
cut per the diagramming standing process), and the acknowledge-flow
diagram was rebuilt as a real Nextcloud diagram. Stamped both source
KB notes.
Live-verified against the real Technitium server: spot-checked
caddy-only/local-only hosts and Postiz's zero-presence claim via
direct DNS resolution, confirmed the forwarder list directly from the
real dns.config (pfSense + Quad9 only, no Cloudflare), and confirmed
the reverse zone's real /24 scope plus its sparse PTR content via
live reverse lookups - fixed the KB stamp accordingly after an
earlier version of it claimed these weren't re-checked. Replaced the
mermaid zone-routing diagram with a real branch-shaped Nextcloud
diagram. Real command output embedded throughout instead of
paraphrased claims.
Live-verified the container_update role's strategy_dockerfile.yml
task file exists at the exact path the KB names, stamped the source
note. Replaced the mermaid cheap-check flowchart with a real
branch-shaped Nextcloud diagram. Added: the real Vault-backed push
auth mechanism (Gitea PAT -> Vault Agent -> docker login
--password-stdin, same pattern as everywhere else in the fleet), the
real docker manifest inspect command instead of a vague "digest
check", real app names in the holdouts table instead of generic
descriptions (matching how the rest of this repo already names real
apps), the anonymous-volume-pruning detail, and a real (redacted)
screenshot of the actual Gitea package registry showing genuine
self-built container images.
Live-verified against the real Wazuh manager (agent_control -l: 11
active agents matching exactly; docker ps: real manager container
name) and stamped both source KB notes. Replaced both mermaid
flowcharts with real branch-shaped Nextcloud diagrams (alert-handling
gate, compliance-hardening gate). Added real evidence throughout: the
live agent roster, a real synthetic SSH-failure line piped through
wazuh-logtest showing actual decoding/rule-match output (MITRE ATT&CK
+ compliance tags included), and real rule IDs in the runbook table
instead of vague categories. New content: the fleet-wide agent
log-queue-overflow bug found and fixed via a dedicated tuning role,
and the compose-stack-vs-rules version-control split.
Swapped the curl/jq text block for what the doc actually needed:
real screenshots of the live Dashy Fleet Schedule Heatmap widget -
one showing a populated cell clicked open (proving the TIP's
click-to-expand claim is real, not just described), one showing the
"no fixed time" section for the 15 jobs excluded from the grid.
Live-pulled the actual 50-row NocoDB inventory (also caught and fixed
a stale KB fact along the way - the note pointed at the wrong NocoDB
deployment entirely, nocodb-content/automation instead of the real
nocodb/rocky-docker instance). Replaced the vague weight-formula prose
with the real numbers, cut the mermaid diagram that only restated the
prose above it, and added five real stories mined from populating the
table by hand: a three-way monthly collision fix, a cascading
Kopia->ClamAV reschedule, a duration figure corrected 8x after
checking real completed-run data, the heaviest job in the whole fleet
(not a backup), and a 404 that looked like an auth problem and
wasn't. Enriched the pending PBS datastore bug with its real
resolution options and added a second real gap: Technitium's
blocklist auto-update is configured but silently a no-op.
Sequence diagram showing the browser carries every hop itself -
Authentik and the app never talk directly - with only the OAuth
authorize/token exchange crossing from the browser-facing zone into
the service-to-service zone. Built to the public-repo diagram
conventions in CLAUDE.md (labelBackgroundColor + matching rich-text
span, off-line label positioning, line-color-matched labels, legend
instead of a color-explaining caption).
Asset renames (matching the new Nextcloud source naming convention —
doc name first, then description):
- architecture-trust-depth.svg -> architecture-overview-trust-depth.svg
- firewall-docker-bypass.svg -> firewall-and-network-docker-bypass.svg
- secrets-lifecycle.svg -> secrets-and-pki-lifecycle.svg
- trust-boundaries-blast-radius.svg -> readme-trust-boundaries-blast-radius.svg
Updated all 4 markdown references accordingly.
Also refreshed diagram exports (secret-distribution-flows.svg, and the
4 renamed ones) with today's fixes, and folded in the earlier pending
sso-and-identity.md work: precise live-verified native-OIDC app list
(12 apps, not ~9), the Proxmox no-Proxy-Provider exception, real API
evidence for it, and the automation-bot migration story.
Add the Suricata dual-layer detail (DNS lockdown, Vault protection
each enforced independently at two layers) and honest live-backend
churn instead of a flat inventory list. Drop the disabled-LAN-frontend
TIP entirely — not worth keeping in the public doc.
Pulled every pfSense child note (Default Policy, Proxmox Firewall Usage,
VM-Level Firewalld Strategy, WAN Rules, Security Tooling, Failure Impact,
HAProxy, Aliases, DNS & Resolver Config, LAN Rules, NAT, VPN), not just
the originally-scoped subset. Live-verified firewalld defaults, SSH
rich-rule restrictions, and Vault's per-client rules directly against
the running hosts - all matched exactly.
Caught and fixed a real staleness bug in the KB itself: WAN Rules and
Security Tooling (both dated a week old) still described CrowdSec as
active, but the more recent Aliases note (updated yesterday, checked
against pfSense's actual config.xml) confirmed the package has been
fully purged. Fixed both stale notes and the public doc, which had
already inherited the wrong claim.
Folded in the staged PAM defense-in-depth note properly - found the
fuller, better story directly in the Ansible role's source comments
(the bug hit twice, on two different hosts, before the permanent fix).
Added the LAN lockdown narrative this doc was missing, the DNS
bypass-block defense-in-depth story, and the this-week port-alias
conversion. Cut two redundant Mermaid diagrams. Added real evidence:
four pfSense screenshots already validated for architecture-overview.md
reused here since they directly prove this doc's own claims, plus two
real firewall-cmd command outputs from live verification this session.
Source Trilium notes (Authentik/SSO Integration, Gitea Access Model)
live-verified and stamped this session - authentik_api_token confirmed
in vault.yml, automation-bot confirmed as a real non-admin Gitea account
via the API.
Cut the redundant Mermaid diagram (prose right below it said the same
thing). Restored the LDAP/superuser-outpost exception from the source
note as a compact callout rather than a full section, proportionate to
its actual weight. Added the real reasoning for centralizing auth and
the proxy-layer defense-in-depth argument, a table of the ~9 apps
running real native OIDC/SAML on top of the universal Proxy Provider
baseline (corrected after initially misstating it as either/or), the
provider-removal discipline, and two screenshots proving the Write/
Read-only access split instead of just asserting it.
Source Trilium note (Secret Distribution Model) was live-verified and
stamped this session - Certificate Flow, App Secret Flow, Configuration
Distribution Flow, and the technitium_api_token Vault-KV exception all
confirmed against the real hosts, not just trusted from the KB.
Replaced the Mermaid diagram, which incorrectly showed the Configuration
Distribution Flow feeding into Vault directly, with a corrected version:
that flow is a control-plane gate on what Vault Agent renders, not a
peer data flow. Added a real Vault Agent log excerpt proving the full
redeploy chain (restart -> render -> reload_command -> container
recreated) actually happens, and restored the technitium_api_token
exception that was in the source note but missing from this doc.
Publishing a ranked list of a live system's own weak points - including
explicitly naming the "single highest-value target" - is a real security
problem for a public repo, not a portfolio concern. Removed the section
and the matching stat-table row. Left the fixed cert-renewal incident in
place since there's nothing exploitable in a resolved issue.
Access model now covers the narrowly-scoped read-only utility policies
(ansible sync roles, metrics-reader, pki-reader) alongside the
host-scoped svc-* pattern - the fuller picture confirmed live against
Vault's actual ACL policy list, not just the original narrower claim.
Added two real screenshots: the live policy list, and an actual audit
log entry showing a KV read with every secret value as hmac-sha256:...
instead of plaintext - proof for the audit-trail claim instead of just
an assertion of it.
Removed the before/after plaintext-secrets Mermaid diagram (the bullets
right below it already said the same thing more clearly) and the
Architecture flowchart (its per-host labels were silently missing
registry-token and Hawser-secret details that didn't fit in the boxes).
Replaced the flowchart with an accurate, complete "who gets what" table
sourced directly from Trilium, one sentence for the proxy-routing fact
it was trying to show, and a new sequence diagram for the actual secret
lifecycle (auth -> render -> read -> async rotation) - a genuinely
different kind of diagram since that's process/time-ordered information
a table can't represent well.
Also restored real specificity Trilium had that the doc had flattened
into vague language: the cert-renewal row now names Technitium
specifically and states the actual incident (an expired cert silently
served for 19 days before the auto-rebuild hook existed), and the audit
trail row now states the real rotation policy (weekly, 8 generations).
Removed the dependency-graph Mermaid diagram (had backwards Vault
dependency arrows, contradicted the documented ingress model) and the
four-boundary Mermaid diagram (fully redundant with the table below it).
Verified every remaining claim against Trilium's Traffic Flow Model and
fixed two that didn't hold up: the DNS-bypass failure behavior overstated
an unconditional SSO bypass, and the notifications failure behavior had
an unsourced claim about backlog retry.
Added the real story behind the trust-boundary hardening (three stages
of the same "trusted by default" flaw getting found and closed, not a
changelog of dated facts), a new trust-depth diagram showing that being
"inside the network" still enforces its own internal boundaries, and
real pfSense screenshots proving the LAN lockdown rules actually exist
in production, not just in the doc.
Fixed one real inaccuracy (Gitea registry scope, Secret Distribution
path count) and replaced generic descriptions with true, specific
detail across all 14 Systems bullets - real incidents, real design
decisions, concrete numbers - each checked against Trilium and, where
relevant, the live Ansible roles rather than trusted at face value.
Also stages a verified-but-unintegrated PAM hardening finding in
docs/firewall-and-network.md for that file's own upcoming audit pass.
Removed by request - it was the one unfinished system in the repo,
and it's the user's call on what represents them publicly. Removed
completely: the README section, docs/content-pipeline.md, and the
two stacks that only existed to back it (postiz, nocodb-content).
Fixed cross-links in dns-naming.md and firewall-and-network.md that
pointed at it (replaced the public-facing-app example with the
still-present Ghost blog), and notifications.md (dropped the
reference, also fixed a leftover 'documented rather than hidden'
phrase in the same paragraph). Stat strip and stack counts updated
(55->53 stacks, 16->15 systems).
README is short/sharp facts, docs/*.md is full depth/process/reasoning
- that split had collapsed into either near-duplicate text in both
files or the fact missing from the README entirely. README now states
the OIDC zone-crossing fact in one crisp sentence; the full doc has
the complete step-by-step breakdown. The LDAP superuser workaround
claim is removed from both - the source material frames it as
contingency guidance for a scenario that may never have come up, not
documented deployed behavior, so it doesn't belong in either file.
The source material says header-based forward-auth is 'the viable
path instead, if SSO is wanted for an app like this' - conditional
contingency guidance for a scenario that may not have actually come
up, not a description of something built and running. Presenting it
as live, deployed behavior in both docs/sso-and-identity.md and the
README was a real accuracy error. Removed from both; the doc still
covers what's actually confirmed (Authentik, dual-zone registration,
native OIDC vs. proxy forward-auth split, least-privilege Git access).
Actually fixed the 4 problems named earlier instead of just naming
them: a numbers-at-a-glance strip up top, the trust-boundary diagram
is now color-coded by boundary type, added a concrete blast-radius
table showing exactly what stays up vs goes down per failure, and
replaced vague figures ('~40 stacks', 'every managed host') with
real ones (41 stacks, 11 fleet hosts).
Leads with the hardest actual decision (4 trust boundaries, each
calibrated to a different risk level, enforced by 3 separate routing
authorities) given full narrative depth instead of flat template
treatment. The other 6 traffic laws move to a compact reference
table linking to their own dedicated docs, avoiding redundancy with
content that already lives elsewhere in more depth.
Previously only delivered 2-3 of the 8 traffic categories it claimed
to cover. Now states every law (ingress, east-west, secrets, DNS,
observability, notifications, CI/CD, management) with its own
Law/Flow/Failure-behavior, plus the 4 global architectural laws that
apply across all of them.
Switch to LR layout, restore all 12 observability-reporting edges
(cut them by mistake, they belong in a dependency graph), drop the
repeated 'reports to' label text that was breaking legibility and
let line style (solid=dependency, dotted=async reporting) carry that
distinction instead. Also shortened edge labels on the trust-boundary
diagram to avoid the same clipping issue.
Completes the full depth pass across all 16 docs - real tech names,
why-this-vs-the-alternative reasoning, heavy cross-linking between
every doc, ranked/specific tradeoffs instead of generic hedges.
Same treatment as the security batch - real tech names, 'why this vs
the alternative' reasoning, heavy cross-linking, ranked/specific
tradeoffs instead of generic hedges.
Names real technology throughout (Vault, Authentik, pfSense,
firewalld, Wazuh) instead of staying generic, adds a 'why this
approach vs the alternative' section to every doc, cross-links
heavily between docs instead of treating each system in isolation.
Names real technology (Technitium) instead of staying vague, adds
explicit cross-links to every other system that actually depends on
DNS, explains why self-hosted DNS was chosen, and adds a 'what I'd
improve' section. Template for redoing the rest.
Completes the docs/ set - all 16 systems now have a full deep-dive
page in the diagram+callout+table style. Architecture overview covers
the 4 trust boundaries and 2 traffic planes; IaC pipeline is a fresh
Packer->Terraform->Ansible writeup replacing the stale old-content/
snapshot; disaster recovery covers the 3 independent backup layers
and the deliberately decoupled OS/app upgrade systems.
Completes the orchestration/registry/content batch - Kestra's
check-pause-approve-apply pattern, the self-hosted build pipeline,
the SOC dashboard's 14-source aggregation, the cron heatmap, and the
in-progress content pipeline, all in the diagram+callout+table style.
Mermaid diagrams up front, GFM alert callouts for key decisions and
gotchas, tables instead of bullet walls - replaces plain prose with
the visual template established for security-monitoring.md.
Secrets & PKI, Secret Distribution Model, SSO & Identity,
Firewall & Network Segmentation, DNS Naming Model, and Security
Monitoring - the first batch of per-system write-ups linked from
the new README, sourced and sanitized from the internal KB.
thesabear