docs: rename diagram assets to doc-prefixed scheme, update exports

Asset renames (matching the new Nextcloud source naming convention —
doc name first, then description):
- architecture-trust-depth.svg -> architecture-overview-trust-depth.svg
- firewall-docker-bypass.svg -> firewall-and-network-docker-bypass.svg
- secrets-lifecycle.svg -> secrets-and-pki-lifecycle.svg
- trust-boundaries-blast-radius.svg -> readme-trust-boundaries-blast-radius.svg
Updated all 4 markdown references accordingly.

Also refreshed diagram exports (secret-distribution-flows.svg, and the
4 renamed ones) with today's fixes, and folded in the earlier pending
sso-and-identity.md work: precise live-verified native-OIDC app list
(12 apps, not ~9), the Proxmox no-Proxy-Provider exception, real API
evidence for it, and the automation-bot migration story.
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thesabear committed 2026-08-27 23:48:41 +03:00
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@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ rule family="ipv4" source address="[automation host]" port port="[this host's SS
> [!WARNING]
> **A real, documented gap**: on Docker hosts, container-published ports bypass firewalld entirely — Docker's own iptables rules are evaluated before firewalld's zone rules, so firewalld's local restrictions only actually protect the small number of *native*, non-containerized services on that host (things like the observability agent from [`docs/observability.md`](observability.md)), not the dozens of containerized apps in [`stacks/`](../stacks/). The network-level segmentation above still applies regardless — pfSense doesn't care whether a port is opened by firewalld or by Docker's own NAT rules — so this is a defense-in-depth gap specifically at the host layer, not an open-to-the-world one. Worth naming precisely rather than glossing over: firewalld protects less of a Docker host's actual attack surface than it might first appear to.
![Two enforcement layers per packet — pfSense always applies, firewalld only catches native services, Docker-published ports skip straight past it](../assets/firewall-docker-bypass.svg)
![Two enforcement layers per packet — pfSense always applies, firewalld only catches native services, Docker-published ports skip straight past it](../assets/firewall-and-network-docker-bypass.svg)
## Edge firewall: three jobs, one device