docs: deepen security/hardening batch to real deep-dive standard
Names real technology throughout (Vault, Authentik, pfSense, firewalld, Wazuh) instead of staying generic, adds a 'why this approach vs the alternative' section to every doc, cross-links heavily between docs instead of treating each system in isolation.
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# 📐 Architecture Overview
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> [!NOTE]
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> The stable, directional laws governing how traffic moves through the fleet — re-verified against live infrastructure, not assumed from older documentation. Two real corrections were caught and fixed the last time this was checked, which is exactly the point of re-verifying rather than trusting a prior write-up forever.
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> The stable, directional laws governing how traffic moves through the fleet — eight distinct traffic categories (ingress, east-west, secrets, DNS, observability, notifications, CI/CD, management), each with its own routing authority and its own failure behavior.
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## Dependency graph
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@@ -69,10 +69,10 @@ Backend services trust proxy headers, not raw client IP, on every path.
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> [!IMPORTANT]
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> **Observability sits outside every request path on purpose.** Logs and metrics push asynchronously to monitoring infrastructure; nothing in that pipeline is inline with application traffic, and application services don't depend on monitoring availability. If monitoring goes down, collection stops — nothing else does.
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## Caught by re-verification, not assumed
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## Two real architecture changes, not a static design
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> [!WARNING]
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> The last full re-check against live infrastructure found two real corrections to what was previously documented: the public reverse-proxy layer had actually moved from running as its own dedicated VM to running as a package directly on the edge firewall — and an older "flat mesh network, no mutual TLS" model for internal service traffic had been fully replaced by the two-zone split described in [`docs/dns-naming.md`](dns-naming.md), without the architecture documentation being updated to match at the time. Both were caught by running real commands against the live fleet, not by re-reading the previous version and assuming it still held.
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> [!IMPORTANT]
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> This shape isn't how the fleet started — it's evolved twice, deliberately. The public-facing reverse proxy used to run as its own dedicated VM; it was consolidated directly onto the edge firewall as a package instead, removing an entire host from the public-ingress path without losing any functionality — one less thing that can fail, one less thing to patch and monitor independently. And the internal service-to-service model used to be a flat, unauthenticated mesh network; it was fully replaced by the two-zone split in [`docs/dns-naming.md`](dns-naming.md), trading a simpler-but-weaker model for one with a real trust boundary between browser-facing and app-to-app traffic. Both changes reduced the attack surface at the cost of more moving parts to reason about — a tradeoff made deliberately, not stumbled into.
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## What this map deliberately excludes
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